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This paper discusses methods for evaluating the impacts of social programs prior to their
implementation. Ex ante evaluation is useful for designing programs that achieve some
optimality criteria, such as maximizing impact for a given cost. This paper illustrates
through several examples the use of behavioral models in predicting the impacts of hypo-
thetical programs. Among the programs considered are wage subsidy programs, conditional
cash transfer programs, and income support programs. In some cases, the behavioral model
justiﬁes a completely nonparametric estimation strategy, even when there is no direct vari-
ation in the policy instrument. In other cases, stronger modeling and/or functional form
assumptions are required to evaluate a program ex ante. We illustrate the application of
ex ante evaluation methods using data from the PROGRESA school subsidy experiment
in Mexico. We assess the eﬀectiveness of the method by comparing ex ante predictions of
program impacts to the impacts measured under the randomized experiment.1 Introduction
Most program evaluation research focuses on the problem of ex post evaluation of existing
programs. For example, evaluation methods such as matching or control function ap-
proaches typically require data on individuals that receive the program intervention (the
t r e a t m e n tg r o u p )a sw e l la sd a t ao nac o m p a r i s o ng r o u ps a m p l et h a td o e sn o tr e c e i v et h e
intervention. A limitation of these approaches is that they do not provide a way evaluating
the eﬀects of programs prior to introducing them.
For many reasons, it is important to develop tools for ex ante evaluation of social pro-
grams. First, ex ante evaluation of a range of programs makes it possible to optimally design
a program that achieves some desired impacts at a minimum cost or maximizes impacts for a
given cost. Finding an optimal program design can be challenging, because it requires simu-
lating the impacts of potentially many hypothetical programs as well as simulating program
take-up rates, in order to assess costs and program coverage. The alternative experimental
approach, which would implement alternative versions of the program and compare their
impacts, is often too costly and too time consuming to be feasible for program design pur-
poses. A second beneﬁto fa ne xa n t ee v a l u a t i o ni st h a ti tm a yh e l pa v o i dt h eh i g hc o s to f
implementing programs that are later found to be ineﬀective.1 Third, ex ante assessment
can provide an idea of what range of impacts to expect after the program is implemented,
which is useful for program placement decisions and for choosing sample sizes for any ex post
evaluation. Fourth, in cases where there is already an existing program in place, ex ante
evaluation methods can be used to study how the impacts would change if some parameters
of the program were altered. As these examples illustrate, an ex ante evaluation is not a
substitute for an ex post evaluation. Even if we regard ex post evaluations that make use of
data on the treated group to be more reliable for estimating treatment impacts of an existing
program, there is still a critical role for ex ante evaluation tools.
1For example, the JTPA (Job Training Partnership Act) program was a multi-billion dollar program in
the U.S. that was recently replaced, in large part because the experimental evaluation of the program showed
that it was ineﬀective for many of the participants.
1In this paper, we illustrate through several examples how to use behavioral models to
predict the impacts of hypothetical programs and to justify particular estimation approaches.
Among the programs considered are wage subsidy programs, conditional cash transfer pro-
grams, and income support programs. Specifying an economic model is crucial to ﬁnding
ways of predicting the eﬀects of a program absent any data on treated individuals. However,
strong functional form assumptions are not necessarily required. As emphasized in early pa-
pers by Marschak (1953) and Hurwicz (1962) and in the more recent work of Heckman
(2000,2001) and Ichimura and Taber (1998, 2002), estimating the eﬀect of a new policy does
not necessarily require specifying the complete structure of the model governing decisions.
Our paper builds on this earlier literature by illustrating, using simple economic models,
how to verify when the conditions for nonparametric policy evaluation are met for a variety
of program interventions. As some of the examples illustrate, nonparametric estimation is
sometimes feasible even when the data do not contain any direct source of variation related
to the program intervention. We also provide examples where fully nonparametric estima-
tion is not feasible and more structure is required to obtain ex ante estimates of program
impacts.
This paper also suggests and implements some simple estimation strategies which are
based on a modiﬁed version of the method of matching. The estimator obtain estimates of
treatment eﬀects by matching untreated individuals to other untreated individuals, where
the particular set of regressors used to select the matches is implied by the economic model.
After describing the methods and the estimators, we study their performance in an appli-
cation to data from the PROGRESA experiment in Mexico. PROGRESA is a conditional
cash transfer program that provides cash transfers to parents conditional on their children
attending school. The program was initially implemented as a randomized experiment, which
creates a unique opportunity to study the performance of ex ante evaluation methods. In
particular, our strategy is to compare the ex ante predicted program impacts, estimated
using data from the randomized-out control group that did not receive the program, to the
program impacts measured under the experiment.
22 Related Literature
The problem of forecasting the eﬀects of hypothetical social programs is part of the more
general problem of studying the eﬀects of policy changes prior to their implementation that
was described by Marschak (1953) as one of the most challenging problems facing empirical
economists.2 In the early discrete choice literature, the problem took the form of the
"forecast problem," in which researchers used random utility models (RUMs) to predict the
demand for a new good prior to its being introduced into the choice set.3 Both theoretical
and empirical criteria were applied to evaluate the performance of the models. Theoretically,
the probabilistic choice models were compared in terms of the ﬂexibility of the substitution
patterns they allowed.4 Empirically, the model’s performance could sometimes be assessed
by comparing the model’s predictions about demands for good with the ex post realized
demand.
In one of the earliest applications of this idea, McFadden (1977) uses a RUM to forecast
the demand for the San Francisco BART subway system prior to its being built and then
checks the accuracy of the forecasts against the actual data on subway demand. Using a
similar idea, Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1992) study the performance of alternative models
at forecasting the impact of a new pension bonus program on the retirement of workers. The
program oﬀered a bonus for workers at a large ﬁrm who were age 55 and older to retire.
The authors ﬁrst estimate the models using data gathered prior to the bonus program and
then compare the models’ forecasts to actual data on workers’ departures.
There are a few empirical studies that study the performance of economic models in
forecasting program eﬀects by comparing models’ forecasts of treatment eﬀects to those
obtained from randomized experiments. Wise (1985) develops and estimates a model of
2See Heckman (2000).
3Much of the initial empirical research was aimed at predicting the demand for transportation modes.
4For example, McFadden observed, with his famous Red Bus-Blue Bus example, that assumping iid
Weibull errors, as in a multinomial logit model, gives unreasonable forecasts when a new good that was
similar to an existing good is introduced into the choice set. (See McFadden, 1984.) More recently, Berry,
Levensohn and Pakes (1995) evaluate alternative models of automobile choice in terms of the ﬂexibility of
the subsitution patterns allowed.
3housing demand and uses it to forecast the eﬀects of a housing subsidy program. He then
compares his models’ forecasts to the subsidy eﬀects observed under a randomized experi-
ment. More recently, Todd and Wolpin (2004) develop and estimate a dynamic behavioral
model of schooling and fertility that they use to forecast the eﬀects of the PROGRESA
program on school and work choices and on family fertility. They evaluate the performance
of the model in predicting the eﬀect of the subsidy by structurally estimating the model
on control group data and comparing the model’s predictions regarding treatment eﬀects
to those estimated under the randomized experiment.5 In this paper, our application is to
the same data and the goal of predicting the eﬀects of the subsidy is similar. However, the
ex ante evaluation methods studied here are much diﬀerent than the methods studied in
Todd and Wolpin (2004). They are based on simpler modeling structures, do not require
structural estimation, and impose very weak functional form assumptions. Another recent
study that also uses experimental data to validate a structural model is that of Lise, Seitz
and Smith (2003), which uses a calibrated search-matching model of the labor market to
predict the impacts of a Canadian program that provides bonuses to long-term welfare re-
cipients for returning to work. They validate the model by comparing its predictions against
an experimental benchmark.
3 Ex Ante Evaluation Methods and Estimators
Ex ante evaluation requires extrapolating from past experience to the learn about eﬀects
of hypothetical programs. In some cases, the source of extrapolation is relatively straight-
forward. For example, to evaluate the eﬀect of a wage subsidy program on labor supply,
we can extrapolate from the observed hours-wage variation in the data. Heckman (2000)
discusses other examples pertaining to evaluating the eﬀects of a commodity tax when there
is observed price variation in the data. Ichimura and Taber (1998, 2002) have an application
5After ﬁnding that the model forecasts well the eﬀects of the existing subsidy program, they use the
estimated model to evaluate the eﬀects of a variety of hypothetical programs. They ﬁnd an alternative
subsidy schedule that would be expected to yield higher impacts on years of educational attainment at the
similar cost to the existing program.
4to evaluating the eﬀects of a college tuition subsidy when there is observed tuition variation
in the data. In other cases, however, there may be no variation in the data directly related
to the policy instrument. An example we consider in this paper is the problem of evaluating
the eﬀects of a subsidy for children to attend school when we start from a situation where
schooling is free for everyone.
Below, we provide examples of how to use structural models to identify program eﬀects
for diﬀerent kinds of program interventions including multiplicative wage subsidies, additive
wage subsidies, income subsidies, a combination of wage and income subsidies, and school
subsidy programs. For each example, we also discuss estimation strategies.
3.1 Wage and income subsidy programs
Example #1: A multiplicative wage subsidy program In this example, we analyze
the eﬀect of introducing a wage subsidy on labor supply. Suppose labor supply behavior
is described by a standard static model in which individuals choose the number of hours to
work given their wage rate and given their level of nonlabor asset income and total time





c = hw + A




If we now introduce a multiplicative subsidy to wages in the amount τ, the budget constraint
becomes
c = h(τw)+A.
Note that the model with the subsidy can be viewed as a version if the model without the
subsidy. That is, if h∗∗ = η(w,A,τ) denotes the solution to the model with the subsidy, then
5we have
h
∗∗ = η(w,A,τ)=ϕ(˜ w,A)
where ˜ w = wτ. This shows that the structural model without the subsidy is also the relevant
one in the presence of the subsidy, so we can study the eﬀect of introducing a subsidy τ from
ex ante wage variation in the data. As discussed in Ichimura and Taber (1998), when the
reduced form relationship is the same under the old and new policy, it is sometimes possible
to do a nonparametric, reduced form evaluation of the policy. In this case, we can assess
the policy eﬀect on each person’s labor supply nonparametrically as follows. First use ex
ante data to estimate the ϕ function that describes the relationship between hours, wages
and assets. The function can be estimated nonparametrically using a method such as kernel,
local linear regression or series estimation.6 For each individual, evaluate the function at
the value w and at the new post-policy value ˜ w to determine the impact that the wage
subsidy has on that person’s labor supply. Taking averages across people within subgroups
of interest provides the average policy eﬀect for that subgroup.
We can view the proposed estimation procedure as a matching estimator.7 To make the
analogy transparent, it is useful to transform the model into the potential outcomes notation
commonly adopted in the treatment eﬀect literature. Deﬁne Y1 = h∗∗ and Y0 = h∗.A l s o ,
let D =1if treated (receives the subsidy). A typical matching estimator (e.g. Rosenbaum
and Rubin, 1983) would assume that there exists a set of observables Z such that
(Y1i,Y 0i) ⊥ ⊥ Di | Zi,
The conventional matching approach is not useful for ex ante evaluation, because it requires
data on Y1, which is not observed. However, a modiﬁed version of matching is possible,
using the fact that the economic model implies
Y1i = Y0j | Ai = Aj ,τwi = wj (1)
6There may be ranges over which the support of w and the support of ˜ w do not overlap. For persons
whose w or ˜ w fall in such ranges, it is not possible to evaluate the program’s impact. See Ichimura and
Taber (1998) for more discussion on this point.
7Ichimura and Taber (1998) also draw an analogy between their proposed method of nonparametrically
recovering policy impacts and matching.
6This identiﬁcation assumption is inherently diﬀerent from the types of assumptions typically
invoked to justify matching estimators. Nonetheless, this condition motivates a matching






Y0i(wi = wjτ,Ai = Aj) − Y0j(wj,A j))},
where Y0j(wj,A j) denotes the hours of work choice for an individual j with set of character-
istics (wj,A j) and Y0i(wi = wjτ,Ai = Aj) the hours of work choice for a matched individual
with characteristics (wjτ,Aj). The matches can only be performed in the region Sp where
the support of ˜ w = wjτ lies within the support of wj.8 An interesting distinction between
this approach and conventional matching approaches is that here particular functions of
observables are equated, whereas conventional matching estimators equate the observables
directly.
The above example shows that it is possible to estimate the impact of the policy under
weak assumptions, notably, without having to specify the functional form of the utility func-
tion. The main assumption is that the subsidy only operates through the budget constraint
and does not directly aﬀect utility. In general, this approach could break down if we allowed
the subsidy to aﬀect utility directly (U = U(c,1 − h,τ)), in a way that leads to a violation
of the condition that η(w,A,τ)=ϕ(˜ w,A). Whether such a violation occurs will depend
on the speciﬁc functional form of the utility function. For example, it is straightforward
to show that if any aﬃne transformation of the utility function is additively separable in τ
(U(c,1−h)+v(τ)), then it is possible to estimate the eﬀect of the policy nonparametrically,
even if τ directly aﬀects utility. This would allow, for example, for a "feel good" eﬀect from
receiving the subsidy.
Finally, although we have discussed the example in terms of a wage subsidy, the analysis
w o u l da l s oh o l di fτ were a tax instead of a subsidy. In the case of a tax, the function v(τ)
might represent a psychic beneﬁt or a psychic cost that people get from paying taxes.9 Also,
8Sp = { ˜ w such that fw(˜ w) > 0}, where fw(˜ w) is the density of w evaluated at ˜ w.
9It could also represent the beneﬁts that people derive from public goods provided by the total taxes
7w h i l ew eh a v ef o c u s e do nh o u r sw o r ka st h eo u t c o m eo fi n t e r e s t ,t h es a m ea n a l y s i sw o u l d
apply if the outcome of interest were the decision to work, which is just a transformation of
hours of work (i.e. 1(h∗ > 0)).
Allowing for unobserved heterogeneity I nt h ea b o v em o d e l ,t h e r ei sn ou n o b s e r v e d
heterogeneity, so that all individuals with t h es a m ea s s e ta n dw a g ev a l u e sm a k et h es a m e
decision. To make the model more realistic, we can incorporate an unobserved heterogeneity





c = hw + A
Now, the optimal choices for hours worked will also be a function of the unobserved hetero-
geneity term, µ : h∗ = ϕ(w,A,µ). W i t ht h es u b s i d y ,t h eo p t i m a lc h o i c ei sh∗∗ = ϕ(˜ w,A,µ).
The eﬀect of the wage subsidy on an individual is
ϕ(˜ w,A,µ) − ϕ(w,A,µ)




{ϕ(˜ w,A,µ) − ϕ(w,A,µ)}f(µ|A,w)dµ,
where f(µ|A,w) is the conditional density of the unobservables.
Because µ is unobserved, it is not possible to match individuals based on their values of
µ. To justify the application of the matching in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity,
we require that:
E(h
∗∗|A = Ai,w= wi)=E(h
∗|A = Ai,w= τwi) (2)
or equivalently
E(Y1|A = Ai,w= wi)=E(Y0|A = Ai,w= τwi)
collected, where we would have to assume that an individual does not take into account his small contribution
to the total taxes collected when deciding on labor supply.
8I ft h ed i s t r i b u t i o no ft h eu n o b s e r v a b l e sd o e sn o td e p e n do nt h ew a g e s( f(µ|A,w)=f(µ|A))









using our assumption that f(µ|˜ w,A)=f(µ|w,A).






E(Y0i|wi = wjτ,Ai = Aj) − Y0j(wj,A j))},
where Y0 denotes h∗ as before. E(Y0i|wi = wjτ,Ai = Aj) can be estimated nonparametri-
cally by nearest neighbor, kernel or local linear matching.(See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
for discussion of nearest neighbor methods and Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997, for
discussion of other nonparametric methods).10
Example #2: An additive wage subsidy program We next consider ex ante evalua-
tion under alternative subsidy schemes. For simplicity, we ignore unobserved heterogeneity,
since the treatment of it would be the same as in the previous example. Consider the same
set-up as before, but now assume that the subsidy to wages is additive instead of multiplica-
tive. In this case, the constraint (with subsidy) becomes
c = hw + hτ + A,
which we can write as
c = h(w + τ)+A.
Thus, we have
h
∗∗ = η(w,A,τ)=ϕ(˜ w,A),
where ˜ w = w+τ.This justiﬁes using an estimation strategy identical to that in the previous
example, except that now we match untreated individuals with wages ˜ w = w +τ and assets
A to untreated individuals with wages w and assets A.
10Here, the matching has to be performed on two variables.
9Example #3: An income transfer program Next consider a program that does not
alter wages, but supplements income by an amount τ. In this case, the budget constraint
becomes
c = hw + τ + A,
which can be written as
c = hw + ˜ A,
where ˜ A = A + τ. Thus,
h
∗∗ = η(w,A,τ)=ϕ(w, ˜ A).
In this case, the estimation strategy matches untreated individuals with wages and assets
equal to w and A to other untreated individuals with wages and assets equal to w and ˜ A.
Example #4: A combination wage subsidy and income transfer Suppose a pro-
gram provides an earnings supplement in the amount τ1 and an additive wage subsidy in
the amount τ2.The budget constraint takes the form
c = h(w + τ1)+A + τ2,
which can be written as
c = h˜ w + ˜ A,
where ˜ w = w + τ1 and ˜ A = A + τ2. To obtain nonparametric estimates of program impacts
through matching, untreated individuals with values of wages and assets equal to (˜ w, ˜ A)
are matched to other untreated individuals with values of wages and assets equal to (w,A).
Interestingly, matching is used to estimate program eﬀects, but none of the observables are
actually equated.
3.2 School attendance subsidy programs
In recent years, many governments in developing countries have adopted school subsidy
programs and other conditional cash transfer programs as a way to alleviate poverty and
10stimulate investment in human capital. Programs that condition cash transfers on school
attendance currently exist in Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Nicaragua.11
We next consider how to evaluate the eﬀects of a school subsidy programs, under the
assumption that there is no direct variation in the data in the price of schooling. This
example and the next one is based on a model presented in Todd and Wolpin (2004). The
application in that paper was to evaluating the eﬀect of the PROGRESA program that was
introduced in Mexico in 1997 as a means of increasing school enrollment and reducing child
labor. In this example, child wages play a crucial role in identifying school subsidy eﬀects.
In the ﬁrst variant of the model (example #5), we assume that child wage oﬀers are observed.
Later, in example, #6, we assume child wages are not observed.
Example #5: School attendance subsidy when child wage oﬀers are observed
Consider a household making a single period decision about whether to send a single child
to school or to work. Household utility depends on consumption (c) a n da ni n d i c a t o rf o r
whether the child attends school (s). A child that does not attend school is assume to work
in the labor market at wage w (below we consider an extension to allow for leisure as another
option). Letting y denote household income, net of the child’s earnings, the problem solved





c = y + w(1 − s).
11Bangladesh has adopted a similar kind of program that conditions food transfers on school attendance.
(cite Ravaillon’s paper)
11In this example, the optimal choice s∗ = ϕ(y,w).N o wc o n s i d e rt h ee ﬀects of a policy that





c = y + w(1 − s)+τs.
We can rewrite the constraint of the model as
c =( y + τ)+( w − τ)(1 − s),
which shows that the optimal choice of s in the presence of the subsidy is s∗∗ = ϕ(˜ y, ˜ w),
where ˜ y = y + τ and ˜ w = w − τ. That is, the schooling choice for a family with income y
and child wage w that receives the subsidy is, under the model, the same as the schooling
choice for a family with income ˜ y and child wage ˜ w.
Estimation We can estimate the eﬀect of the subsidy program on the proportion of
children attending school by matching children from families with income ˜ y and child wage
oﬀers ˜ w to children from families with income y and child wages w. A matching estimator
of average program eﬀe c t sf o rt h o s eo ﬀered the program (the so-called "intent-to-treat" or






{E(si|wi = wj − τ,yi = yj + τ) − sj(wj,y j)},
where sj(wj,A j) denotes the school attendance decision for a child of family j with char-
acteristics (wj,y j). As before, the average can only be taken over the region of overlapping
support SP, which in this case is over the set of families j for which the values wj − τ and
yj+τ lie within the observed support of wi and yi. Using the same reasoning, we can evaluate
the eﬀects of a range of school subsidy programs that have both an income subsidy and a
schooling subsidy component. Thus, nonparametric reduced form policy variation is feasible
12in this case, even when when there is no variation in the data in the policy instrument (the
price of schooling).
In this example, not all families choose to participate in the subsidy program. Since the
costs of the program will depend on how many families participate in it, a key question of
interest is the coverage rates of the hypothetical programs. In this case, the coverage rate
is the probability that a family takes up the subsidy program or, in other words, sends their
child to school when the subsidy program is in place:
Pr(s(w − τ,y+ τ)=1 )
= E(s(w − τ,y+ τ))
We can estimate this probability by a nonparametric regression of the indicator variable s
on w and y, evaluated at the points w − τ,y+ τ. This estimation can only be performed
for families whose w and y values fall within the region of overlapping support, since non-
parametric estimation does not provide a way of extrapolating outside the support region.
Taking averages across the probability estimates for all families then provides an estimate
of the overall predicted take-up rate.
Using the ITT estimate and the take-up rate estimate, we can obtain an estimate of the
average impact of treatment on the treated (TT). The relationship between ITT and TT for
a family with characteristics (w,y) is:





E(s(w − τ,y+ τ))
.
To obtain an overall average estimate of the impact of treatment on the treated, we integrate
over the distribution of w and y values that fall within the support region. Empirically, this
can be done by simply averaging over the TT estimates for each of the individual families






{E(si|wi = wj − τ,yi = yj + τ) − sj(wj,y j))}
E(si|wi = wj − τ,yi = yj + τ)
.
13Extension to Multiple Children T h ea b o v em o d e la s s u m e dt h a tp a r e n t a lu t i l i t y
depends directly on child schooling. The model could easily be modiﬁed to allow parental
utility to be a function of children’s future wages (wf), which in turn depends on schooling
levels (U(c,wf(s))).
The above model also assumed that parents were making decisions about one child. If
we were willing to assume that fertility is exogenous with respect to the subsidy, then the
model could easily be modiﬁed to allow for multiple children. For example, suppose there
are two children in the family who are eligible for subsidies τ1 and τ2,h a v ew a g eo ﬀers w1
and w2, and for which the relevant schooling indicators are s1 and s2. (Children of diﬀerent
















Estimation of the subsidy eﬀect on enrollment requires that we match families with the same
conﬁguration of children. In this case, families with income level y and child wages w1 and
w2 are matched to other families with income level ˜ y =( y + τ1 + τ2) and child wage oﬀers
˜ w1 = w1 − τ1 and ˜ w2 = w1 − τ1.
An example where nonparametric ex ante policy evaluation is not possible
Suppose we modify the model presented above to allow for an alternative use of children’s





c = y + w(1 − l − s),
14where the optimal choice of schooling and leisure is s∗ = ϕ(y,w) and l∗ = λ(y,w). When the
family is oﬀered the subsidy, the constraint can be written as
c = y + w(1 − l − s)+τs
=( y + τ)+( w − τ)(1 − s) − (w − τ)l + τl
A ss e e nb yt h el a s te q u a t i o n ,i ti sn o tp o s s i b l et ot r a n s f o r mt h ec o n s t r a i n ti n t oo n et h a ti s
solely a function of ˜ y = y+τ and ˜ w = w−τ. The optimal choice of s in the presence of the
subsidy is a function of ˜ y, ˜ w and of τ. Because of the dependence on τ, the policy function
in the absence of the subsidy will not be the same as in the presence of the subsidy. We can
still forecast the eﬀect of the policy, but doing so requires parametric assumptions on the
utility function that allow explicit derivation of the policy functions with and without the
subsidy.
Example # 6: School attendance subsidy when only accepted child wages are
observed Consider the same model as in example #5, except that now assume that child
wage oﬀers are only observed for families who decide not to send their children to school.
Also, assume that the cost of attending school depends on the distance to school, denoted





c = y +( 1− s)w − δ(k)s
lnw = µw + ε,
where the last equation is the log wage oﬀer equation, and δ(k) is the distance cost function.
The family chooses to send their child to school (s =1 )if U(y − δk,1) >U(y + µw + ε,0).
Below, we show that we can identify ex-ante treatment eﬀe c t si nt h ec a s ew h e r et h ew a g e
distribution is only partially observed without having to make a distributional assumption
15on the utility function. However, we do need to impose a distributional assumption on log
wages. Assume that ε is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance equal to σ2
ε and that
the distribution of ε does not depend on y or k. First, consider estimation of the parameters
of the density of child wages. To take into account selectivity in observed wages, write the
wage equation as
lnw = µw + E(ε|s =0 )+{ε − E(ε|s =0 ) }
= µw + E(ε|U(y + µw + ε,0) >U(y − δk,1)) + u
= µw + E(ε|ε>η (y,k)) + u
where u has conditional mean zero by construction and η is some function of y and k.T h e







where we use the assumption that f(ε)=f(ε|y,k). Next, note that
Pr(s =1 |y,k)=Pr(ε>η (y,k))
=1 − Φ(η(y,k)).
The normal cdf Φ is invertible, so we can write η(y,k)=1 − Φ−1(P)=K(P),w h e r e
P =P r ( s =1 |y,k). We can obtain a nonparametric estimate of the conditional probability
of attending school from a nonparametric regression of s on y and k. The equation for
observed wages can now be written as:












where λ(·) is the Mill’s ratio function and K is the function deﬁned above. Once we construct
the Mill’s ratio regressor, the parameters µw and σε can be estimated using least squares.(See
Heckman, 1979). Thus, we obtain estimates of µw and of σε, the parameters of the density
of the child log wage oﬀer equation, φ(w).
16To evaluate ex ante program impacts using matching, we require an estimate of Pr(s =
1|y,w,k) for alternative values of y, w and distance k. Use the fact that
Pr(s =1 |y,w,k)=1 − Pr(s =0 |y,w,k)
=1 −
f(w,y,k|s =0 )P r ( s =0 )
f(w,y,k)
=1 −
f(w,y,k|s =0 )P r ( s =0 )
g(w|y,k)g(y,k)
=1 −
f(w,y|s =0 )P r ( s =0 )
˜ φ(w)g(y,k)
,.
where ˜ φ(w) is the density of wages (log normal with parameters µw and σε). The conditional
density f(w,y,k|s =0 ) ,the joint density g(y,k), and the unconditional probability Pr(s =0 )
can all be nonparametrically estimated directly from the data.






{Pr(si =1 |wi = wj − τ,yi = yj + τ,ki = kj) − Pr(sj =1 |wj,y j,k j)}.
Example #7: A two-period model Next, we consider an extension of the school
subsidy example (with observed wage oﬀers) to a two period model with perfect foresight,
assuming that individuals can borrow over time. The price of consumption is assumed to
be constant over time. The subsidy for school attendance is τ1 in the ﬁrst period and τ2 in
the second time period. Let yi denote family income net of child income and wi denote child
wages in period i. The problem without the subsidy is
max
{c1,c2,s1,s2}
U(c1,c 2,s 1,s 2)
s.t.
c1 + c2 ≤ y1 + y2 + w1(1 − s1)+w2(1 − s2).
The schooling choices in each period can be written as functions
s1 = ϕ1(ˆ y,w1,w 2)
s2 = ϕ2(ˆ y,w1,w 2)
17where ˆ y = y1 + y2.
When the subsidy is available, the constraint is
c1 + c2 = y1 + y2 + w1(1 − s1)+w2(1 − s2). + τ1s1 + τ2s2
=( y1 + τ1 + y2 + τ2)+( w1 − τ1)(1 − s1)+( w2 − τ2)(1 − s2),
so that the optimal schooling choices are
s
∗
1 = ϕ1(˜ y, ˜ w1, ˜ w2)
s
∗
2 = ϕ2(˜ y, ˜ w1, ˜ w2),
where ˜ y = y1 + τ1 + y2 + τ2, ˜ w1 = w1 − τ1, and ˜ w2 = w2 − τ2.
Estimation of program eﬀects requires matching untreated families with two-period earn-
ings equal to y1 + y2 to other families with two-period earnings equal to ˜ y. Matching would
a l s oh a v et ob ep e r f o r m e do nt h eb a s i so fe a c ho ft h ew a g e s( t h a ti s ,t h ew a g ep r o ﬁle).
Extension #1: Next, consider a modiﬁcation of the previous example to allow for a
subsidy that is increasing in the total number of years of schooling. Thus, the subsidy in
the second period depends on the ﬁrst period schooling decision. Suppose the subsidy is τ2
if s1 =0and s2 =1 , and it is τ3 if s1 =1and s2 =1 . T h ec o n s t r a i n ti nt h i sc a s ei s
c1 + c2 = y1 + y2 + w1(1 − s1)+w2(1 − s2). + τ1s1 + τ2s2(1 − s1)+τ3s1s2
= y1 + y2 + w1(1 − s1)+w2(1 − s2). + τ1s1 + τ2s2 +( τ3 − τ2)s1s2 +[ τ1 − τ1 + τ2 − τ2]
= {y1 + τ1 + y2 + τ2} +( w1 − τ1)(1 − s1)+( w2 − τ2)(1 − s2)+( τ3 − τ2)s1s2
In this case, it is generally not possible to transform the constraint into the one of the original
problem. That is, there is no way to mimic this particular type of subsidy using changes in
income and wages.13 This example reduces to the previous one if τ2 = τ3.14
13If the wage level in the second period depends on whether the individual attended school in period one,
then it would be possible to transform the model into a version of the model without the subsidy.
14T h ec a s ew h e r et h e r ei sn os u b s i d yi nt h eﬁrst period and the ﬁnal subsidy depends on the total number
of years of schooling accumulated (s1 + s2) is also a version of example #1.
18Extension #2 Now, consider the model from example one, but assume that borrowing
against future income is not allowed, so that the constraints (without subsidies) can be
written as
c1 ≤ y1 + w1(1 − s1).
c2 ≤ y2 + w2(1 − s2).
In this case, the optimal choice of s1 and s2 depends on the proﬁle of earnings and the proﬁle
of wages:
s1 = ϕ1(y1,y 2,w 1,w 2)
s2 = ϕ2(y1,y 2,w 1,w 2)
It is straightforward to verify that with the subsidy, we get
s
∗
1 = ϕ1(˜ y1, ˜ y2, ˜ w1, ˜ w2)
s
∗
2 = ϕ2(˜ y1, ˜ y2, ˜ w1, ˜ w2),
where ˜ yi = yi +τi and ˜ wi = wi −τi. In this case, nonparametric estimation of policy eﬀects
requires matching on the earnings and wage proﬁles.
4 Empirical application: predicting eﬀects of a school
subsidy program
In this section, we apply the methods described previously to analyze the eﬀects of the
cash transfer program PROGRESA that was introduced in Mexico in 1997. The program
provides transfers to families that are contingent upon their children regularly attending
school.15 These transfers are intended to alter the private incentives to invest in education
by oﬀsetting the opportunity cost of not sending children to school. Table 1 shows the
15The program also provides a small transfer to the family contingent on visiting a health clinic for check-
ups as well as nutritional supplements for children under the age of two. We ignore this other component
of the program and focus on the school subsidies, which are by far the largest component for most families.
19schedule of beneﬁts, which depends on the child’s grade level and gender. In recognition of
the fact that older children are more likely to engage in family or outside work, the transfer
amount increases with the child’s grade level and is greatest for secondary school grades. The
beneﬁt level is also slightly higher for girls, who traditionally have lower school enrollment
levels.
To participate in the program, families have to satisfy some eligibility criteria, which
depend on factors such as whether their home has a dirt ﬂoor, crowding indices, and owner-
ship of assets (e.g.car). In total, the beneﬁt levels that families receive under the program
is substantial relative to their income levels, about 20-25% of total income. (Skouﬁas and
Parker, 2000) Almost all the families oﬀered the program participate in it to some extent.16
Partial participation is possible, for example, if the family can send some children to school
but not others.
Table 1: Monthly Transfers for School Attendance
School level Grade Monthly Payment
Female Males
Primary 3 70 70
48 0 8 0
5 105 105
6 135 135
Secondary 7 210 200
8 235 210
9 255 225
The PROGRESA program was initially introduced in rural areas, has since expanded
into semi-urban and urban areas, and currently has a coverage of about ten million fam-
ilies. For purposes of evaluation, the initial phase of PROGRESA was implemented as a
social experiment, in which 506 rural villages were randomly assigned to either participate
in the program or serve as controls.17 Randomization, under ideal conditions, allows mean
program impacts to be assessed through simple comparisons of outcomes for the treatment
16In the rural villages that participated in the initial PROGRESA experiment, all the households were
interviewed and informed of their program eligibility status.
17Data are available for all households located in the 320 villages assigned to the treatment group and for
all households located in the 186 villages assigned to the control group.
20and control groups. Schultz (2000a,2000b) and Behrman, Sengupta and Todd (2005) inves-
tigate the program’s experimental impacts on school enrollment and ﬁnd signiﬁcant impacts,
particularly for children in secondary school grades.(7th-9th grade)
In this paper, we also use data from the PROGRESA experiment, but with a focus on
studying the eﬀectiveness of ex ante evaluation methods. As noted in the introduction,
our strategy is to predict the impacts of the program only using data on the randomized-
out control group, and then compare the predictions to the impacts estimated under the
experiment.
4.1 Data sample
The data gathered as part of the PROGRESA experiment provide rich information at the
individual, the household and the village level. The data include information on school
attendance and grade attainment for all household members and information on employment
and wages for individuals age eight and older. The data we analyze were gathered through a
baseline survey administered in October, 1997 and follow-up survey administered in October,
1998. In the fall of 1998, households in the treatment group had been informed of their
eligibility and began receiving subsidy checks. Control group households did not receive
beneﬁts over the course of the experiment.18
From the household survey datasets, we use information on the age and gender of the
child, the child’s highest grade completed, whether the child is currently enrolled in school,
and income of the mother and father. Total family income is obtained as the sum of the
husband’s and the wife’s earnings, including income from main jobs as well as any additional
income from second jobs. Our analysis subsample includes children from program eligible
families, who are age 12 to 15 in 1998, who are reported to be the son or daughter of the
household head, and for whom information is available in the 1997 and 1998 surveys. The
sample excludes children from families where the husband or the wife reports being self-
18The control group was also incorporated two years later, but they were not told of the plans for their
future incorporation during the time of the experiment.
21employed, which was necessary because the data are not detailed enough to determine their
income. In addition to the household survey datasets, supplemental data were gathered
at the village level. Most importantly, for our purposes, information is available on the
minimum wage paid to day laborers in each village, which we take as a measure of the
potential earnings of a child laborer.
The upper panel of Figure 1 shows a histogram of the minimum monthly laborer wages,
which range from 330 to 1320 pesos per month with a median of 550 pesos.19 The lower
panel of the ﬁgure shows a histogram of family income, with values ranging from 8 to 13,750
pesos (median: 660). For many families meeting the program eligibility criteria, the total
monthly earnings are not much above that of a full-time worker working at the minimum
laborer wage.
4.2 Estimation and empirical results
We predict the impact of the PROGRESA subsidy program on school enrollment, according







{E(si|wi = wj − τj,y i = yj + τj) − sj(wj,y j))},
where sj is an indicator for whether child j is enrolled in school, wj i st h ew a g eo ﬀer for
child j, and yj is family income (net of any child income). This estimator matches control
g r o u pc h i l d r e nw i t ho ﬀered wage wj and family income yj to other control group children
with oﬀered wage wj − τj and yi = yj + τj. Here, τj represents the subsidy level for which
the child is eligible. Since subsidies vary by grade level, children of the same age can be
eligible for diﬀerent subsidy levels if they attend school.20
We estimate the matched outcomes E(si|wi = wj − τj,y i = yj + τj) nonparametrically
using a standard two dimensional kernel regression estimator. Letting w0=wj − τj and
19Approximately 10 pesos equals 1 US dollar.
20In Mexico, it is fairly common for children of a given grade level to vary a lot by age.
22y0 = yj + τ, the estimator is given by

































where K (·) denotes the kernel function and hw
n and hy
n are the smoothing (or bandwidth)
parameters. We use a biweight kernel function:
K(s)=( 1 5 /16)(s
2 − 1)
2 if |s| ≤ 1
=0else,




K(s)sds =0 , and
R
K(s)s2ds <




n → 0 and hy
n → 0 as n →∞ .21
The nonparametric estimator is only deﬁned at points where the data density is positive.
For this reason, we need restrict the estimation to points of evaluation that lie within the
region SP,w h e r eSP = {(w,y) ∈ R2 such that f(w,y) > 0) and f(w,y) is the density.
We determine empirically whether a particular point of evaluation (w0,y 0) lies in SP,b y
estimating the density at each point and checking whether it lies above a cut-oﬀ trimming
level, q, that is small and positive. That is, we check whether
ˆ f( ˙ w0,y 0) >q ,
where ˆ f(·,·) is a nonparametric estimate of the density.22
Tables 2a and 2b compare the predicted program impacts obtained by the method de-
scribed above to the experimental impacts for boys and girls. The table gives the impacts on
enrollment in percentage points. Impacts are estimated separately over various age ranges.23
21See, e.g., Härdle and Linton (1994).
22This procedure is similar to that used in Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997).
23We did not estimate separately by each age, because the sample sizes become too small to be reliable
for nonparametric estimation. The bandwidth was set equal to 200 for wages and equal to 400 for income.
The cut-oﬀ used for determining SP was set equal to 1e − 08.
23The sample size in each cell is shown in parentheses along with the percentage of observa-
t i o n st h a tl i eo u t s i d eo fSP. For all the age/gender groups, the experimentally estimated
program impacts are positive. The predicted impacts are also all positive, even though the
estimation procedure does not constrains them to be positive. For boys, the predicted im-
pact understates the actual impact for boys age 12-13 (0 vs. 4.9 percentage points), but
then overstates it for boys age 14-15 (5.7 vs. 1.6). The predicted impact over the entire
range, age 12-15, is fairly close to the experimentally estimated impact (2.8 vs. 2.1). For
girls, the predicted program impacts tend to underestimate the actual program impacts - by
0.9 percentage points for ages 12-13, 4.9 for ages 14-15 and and 2.4 for the overall age range
12-15.
Table 2a





















In addition to predicting the eﬀect of the existing subsidy program, we can also use the
same estimator to study the eﬀects of other hypothetical programs, such as changes in the
24subsidy schedule. Tables 3a and 3b consider a increase of the subsidy to 1.5 times the original
subsidy schedule, as well as a decrease to one half of the original subsidy amounts. As seen
in parentheses, the fraction of observations that lie outside of SP increases at higher levels
of the subsidy, and decreases at smaller subsidy amounts. This shows clearly how the range
of subsidies levels that can be considered is limited by the range of the data.24
With one exception for boys, the predicted impacts suggest that enrollment levels would
either stay the same or increase as the level of subsidy increases. For half the original subsidy,
the impacts for girls and boys are roughly comparable. When we increase the subsidy, the
p r e d i c t i o n si n d i c a t es i z e a b l ee ﬀects for both boys and girls. but the eﬀe c ts i z ei sm u c hl a r g e r
for girls.
Table 3a
Eﬀects of Counterfactual Subsidy Levels
Boys
Ages 1.5*Original Original 0.5*Original
12-13 0.0 0.0 0.0
(232,63%) (232,11%) (232,0)
14-15 9.7 5.7 3.2
(197,57%) (197,11%) (197,0)
12-15 3.1 2.1 2.2
(262,64%) (429,11%) (429,0)
Table 3b
Eﬀects of Counterfactual Subsidy Levels
Girls
Ages 1.5*Original Original 0.5*Original
12-13 9.4 6.8 1.4
(221,37%) (221,10%) (221,0)
14-15 19.2 9.9 1.8
(179,39%( (179,11%) (179,0)
12-15 13.5 8.9 2.2
(400,38%) (400,10%) (400,0)
24Also, see Ichimura and Taber (1998) for detailed discussion on this point.
255C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper considered methods for evaluating the impacts of social programs prior to their
implementation. Through several examples, we showed how behavioral models can be
used to predict impacts of hypothetical programs and to justify particular estimation strate-
gies. In many cases, consideration of the particular structure of the model suggested a fully
nonparametric estimation strategy. We illustrated when the conditions for nonparametric
policy evaluation are met for a variety of program interventions, including wage subsidies and
income support programs. We also gave examples where the conditions for nonparametric
policy evaluation were not met and stronger assumptions are required.
This paper also suggested some simple estimators, which are modiﬁed versions of match-
ing estimators. The estimators compare untreated individuals to other untreated individuals,
where the set of variables on which the matching is based is implied by the behavioral model.
We study the performance of the estimators using data from the Mexican PROGRESA ex-
periment. A comparison of the predicted program impacts, obtained using only the control
group data, to the experimentally estimated impacts show that the predictions are generally
of the correct sign and usually come within 30% of the experimental impact.
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